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Previous studies of real wage cyclicality have made only sparing use of the
micro-data detail that is available in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). The present paper brings to bear this additional detail to investi-
gate the robustness of previous results and to examine whether there are
important cross-sectional and demographic diﬀerences in wage cyclicality.
Although real wages were procyclical across the entire distribution of workers
from 1967 to 1991, the wages of lower-income, younger, and less-educated
workers exhibited greater procyclicality. However, workers’ straight-time
hourly pay rates have been acyclical, suggesting that more variable pay mar-
gins such as bonuses, overtime, late shift premia, and commissions have
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1. Introduction
John Maynard Keynes famously remarked that, “for a given organisation, equipment, and
technique, real wages and the volume of output (and hence of employment) are uniquely
correlated, so that, in general, an increase in employment can only occur to the accom-
paniment of a decline in the rate of real wages.” (Keynes, 1936, p. 17). Since then, the
correlation between real wages and employment has been an prominent testing ground for a
wide array of macroeconomic models. For example, a procyclical relationship between real
wages and employment is predicted by technology-driven models of business cycles (e.g.,
Kydland and Prescott, 1982, Barro and King, 1984), models of strongly countercyclical
markups (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992), and models of external increasing returns
to scale (e.g., Bartelsman, Caballero, and Lyons, 1994). By contrast, a countercyclical
relationship between real wages and employment is predicted by Classical and traditional
Keynesian models and by more modern DSGE models in which technology shocks play
only a minor role. The goal of the present paper is to investigate the correlation between
real wages and unemployment in more depth than previous studies by making fuller use
of the microdata available in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Historically, the relationship between real wages and unemployment (or other busi-
ness cycle indicators) has been explored using economy-wide measures of “the real wage,”
namely aggregate wages paid divided by aggregate hours worked, with diﬀerent measures
of the numerator, denominator, and deﬂator being preferred by diﬀerent authors (see Abra-
ham and Haltiwanger (1995) for a good survey). These studies have typically found real
wages to be acyclical or slightly procyclical over the postwar period, and somewhat more
procyclical since the late 1960s.
However, the highly aggregate nature of the data in these studies has led to questions
about the accuracy and relevance of the results. For example, low-wage workers tend to
have substantially more cyclical hours and employment than high-wage workers, so that in
every recession, a large number of low-wage worker-hours are dropped from the aggregate
wage statistic; this would cause the economy’s aggregate wage to be countercyclical even
if every individual’s wage were completely ﬁxed over the business cycle (Stockman, 1983,2
Solon, Barsky, and Parker, 1994). On the other hand, highly cyclical industries such as
durables manufacturing and construction also have high average wages; in every recession,
then, a large number of these high-wage workers are also dropped from the economy’s
aggregate wage statistic, inducing a procyclical bias in aggregate measures of real wages,
exactly opposite the eﬀect outlined above (Chirinko, 1980, Solon and Barsky, 1989). Fi-
nally, even controlling for worker and industry composition change over the business cycle,
the aggregate wage is an income-weighted measure, in that a 1% change in high-wage
workers’ earnings has a much greater impact on the aggregate wage statistic than a 1%
change in low-wage workers’ pay; if high-wage workers tend to experience less (or more)
wage cyclicality than their low-wage counterparts, the aggregate statistic will again be a
poor measure of what we might think of as the typical worker’s experience.
For all of these reasons, measuring the cyclicality of the economy’s aggregate wage
statistic may reveal relatively little about the experience of typical workers and ﬁrms and
provide relatively little insight into whether a given macroeconomic model is accurately
describing the cyclical relationship between labor supply and labor demand. Micro-level
panel data provides a much better medium for gaining insight into the labor market rela-
tionship between workers and ﬁrms over the business cycle. Beginning with the availability
of enough such data in the 1980s, a number of researchers have begun investigating exactly
this question (e.g., Bils, 1985, Solon, Barsky and Parker, 1994). SBP in particular make
it clear that the composition biases mentioned above are substantial and countercyclical
on net, so that over the period covered by panel data, real wage movements of individual
workers have in fact been strongly procyclical, in sharp contrast to the ﬁndings of little or
no procyclicality in the aggregate statistics mentioned earlier.
However, these panel studies have left open a number of questions. Most importantly,
the time period covered by the data (1966 to the present) has been one of signiﬁcantly
countercyclical prices, so that the ﬁndings of procyclical real wages may be due simply
to rigid nominal wages and countercyclicality of the underlying price deﬂator. Oil shocks
during this period may be playing a substantial direct role as well: a recession brought
on by an exogenous increase in the price of oil may induce employers to shift away from
energy and capital and lower the marginal product of labor while still reducing industry3
and aggregate output, generating a procyclical real wage. It is also dissatisfying that
none of these panel studies attempts to present the data in a more disaggregate format—
for example, SBP simply replace a regression of the change in the average “real wage”
mentioned earlier with a regression of the average of the changes in real wages experienced
by the panel. Although this statistic is relatively free of the aggregation biases mentioned
above, it fails to make use of an enormous amount of detail inherent in the data. These
studies have also ignored the availability of local-area unemployment rates and data on
straight-time hourly wages, which are available for all workers who are paid by the hour
in the PSID. These additional data provide an opportunity to check for robustness in the
ﬁndings mentioned above, and to examine them in greater detail.
The present paper investigates all of these issues, with a view toward relating the
results to macroeconomic theories of the business cycle. The remainder of the paper pro-
ceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and the basic empirical framework used for
the analysis. Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes. An Ap-
pendix provides additional technical details about the exact data series used and empirical
methods.
2. Data and Methods
For data, we use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, a longitudinal survey begun in
1968 that now covers some 8,000 families.1 The two primary micro-data alternatives to the
PSID are the National Longitudinal Survey and the Current Population Survey’s Annual
Demographic Supplements, but both of these have shortcomings as far as measuring wage
cyclicality is concerned. For example, the NLS covers only selected segments of the U.S.
population (young men, young women, men ages 45–59, women ages 30–44, and youths),
and interviews were not taken in at least ﬁve years between 1966 and 1983 due to lack of
funds, so the NLS sample is lacking both in comprehensiveness and continuity. Moreover,
1When families are multiplied by their “family weights” in each year, calculated to account for diﬀeren-
tial sampling rates, mortality rates, and rates of nonresponse across demographic groups, as well as issues
of family composition change, the resulting cross-sections are representative of 1968 America (excluding
Alaska and Hawaii) as it has evolved through the years. The PSID makes no attempt to account for
immigration into the U.S. that has occurred since 1968.4



































Figure 1: U. S. Unemployment Rate, 1966–94
from 1970–76 the NLS did not ask respondents for hours or earnings data on their most
recent job if the respondent was currently unemployed, which creates a sample selection
bias in the data for those years. The Current Population Survey’s Annual Demographic
Supplements is a more promising alternative, having some advantages such as sample size
(it covers roughly 60,000 individuals). Although the CPS data is not truly longitudinal,
year-to-year changes in wages for many individuals in some years can be computed, but
unfortunately these matches cannot be performed for the years 1964–8, 1971–3, 1976–7,
and 1985–6, which include some of the most interesting years of the sample. Moreover,
prior to 1977 the CPS data on hours worked is for the preceding week rather than the
preceding calendar year, which leads to a sample selection problem once again should an
individual be unemployed in the week preceding the survey.
In the PSID, questions on income and hours worked are for the preceding calendar
year, thus avoiding the sample selection problem that is present in both the NLS and CPS
(Blank, 1990, conﬁrms this empirically). Questions about job characteristics are for the job
held at the time of the interview, so they must be lagged one year in order to be matched
to the corresponding hours and income data. Data for household heads is more detailed,
accurate, and complete than for other sample members, hence we take as our sample all5















































Log Real GDP and Linear Trend






























































Figure 2: Log Real GDP and Deviations from Trend
10,114 men who were ever household heads in the PSID between 1968 and 1992 (excluding
the more recent Latino sample). For each year such an individual was household head, we
make use of the following data: total labor income of head; wages and salaries of head;
bonuses, overtime, and commissions of head; head’s annual hours worked; head’s race, age,
and education; whether head works for government or the private sector; whether head’s
job is covered by a union contract; head’s hourly wage if paid by the hour; unemployment
rate for the head’s county of residence; and PSID family weight for the head’s family.
Additional details regarding these series are provided in the Appendix. Data for which
“major assignments” were made by the PSID staﬀ are omitted.
For business cycle indicators, we begin with the national unemployment rate in
Figure 1. Log real GDP and its deviations from trend are presented in Figure 2 for
comparison (we will also consider ﬁrst diﬀerences of these series in some regressions).
Later, we will consider as a cyclical indicator the unemployment rate in the respondent’s
county of residence, as reported in the PSID. Note that “national unemployment rate”
and “real GDP” here refer to the civilian unemployment rate for all civilian workers, Table
B–40, and GDP in 1987 dollars, Table B–2, Economic Report of the President, 1995.
For a measure of the price level, we focus primarily on the 1987 GDP Deﬂator.
Although both the CPI and PPI are more appropriate from a theoretical point of view, the
countercyclical movements in both of these series over the period 1967–91 substantially
dominate those of the GDP Deﬂator (see Figure 3);2 since previous studies have found
2Abraham and Haltiwanger implicitly ﬁnd that the PPI is actually less countercyclical than the CPI6
























































GDP deﬂator .0063 (.0035)
Figure 3: Alternative Measures of Prices
signiﬁcant real wage procyclicality over this time period, we have chosen to be conservative
by taking the least countercyclical price measure. Interested readers can easily modify the
graphs of ﬁrst-diﬀerenced log wages below by subtracting oﬀ the GDP deﬂator and adding
in either the CPI or PPI as desired; the corresponding regression coeﬃcients are likewise
linear and can be similarly adjusted by making use of the coeﬃcients in the accompanying
table (although standard errors cannot be easily adjusted for coeﬃcients so modiﬁed).
Note that the CPI, PPI, and GDP Deﬂator presented here are the CPI–U for all items,
Table B–59, PPI for total ﬁnished goods, Table B–64, and implicit GDP Deﬂator, Table
B–3 (Economic Report of the President, 1995).
Previous researchers using the PSID have typically focused on the “total labor in-
come” variable as their measure of wages. However, about 14% of the weighted sample
earning any labor income in a given year report labor income beyond “wages and salaries”
and “bonuses, overtime, and commissions.” About 8% of male heads who report positive
labor income earn no wages, salaries, bonuses, overtime, or commissions—these people are
primarily self-employed businessmen, professionals, farmers, and ranchers. Because they
make up a nontrivial percentage of the sample, it is possible that the substantial wage
over the years 1970–94. This is due not to the negligible diﬀerence in time period covered, but rather
to diﬀerences in the cyclical indicator used: AH focus on employment and output in the manufacturing
industry alone, rather than the economy as a whole. A graph of manufacturing employment over time
reveals that it never fully recovers from either the 1981–2 or 1991 recessions, so that the last 10 to 15
years appear essentially as one long depression, with the 1990s being particularly severe. Detrended
manufacturing output suﬀers from the same problem to a lesser degree. Comparing these observations to
Figure 3 explains the discrepancy between our results.7
procyclicality found by other researchers is due partly to these nonwage sources of income.
To check this, we computed wages in two ways, ﬁrst using the head’s “total labor income”
variable and then the “wages and salaries” plus “bonuses, overtime, and commissions”
variables. In fact, we found essentially no diﬀerences in the cyclicality of these two mea-
sures of wages—in all of our graphs and results below, diﬀerences between using “labor
income” as compared to “wages and salaries” plus “bonuses, overtime, and commissions”
were negligible.3 Thus, for the remainder of the paper, we will simply present the results
using annual total labor income divided by annual total hours worked as the wage measure.
To make quantitative measurements of real wage cyclicality and comparisons across
demographic groups, we will run regressions of the form:
Δwt = β1 + β2 t + β3 ΔUnempt + εt, (1)
where wt is the given real wage statistic (in logs), Δwt is its ﬁrst-diﬀerence (i.e., wt−wt−1),
t is a time trend, Unemp is the national unemployment rate, and the βi are parameters
to be estimated by ordinary least squares. When considering wage levels or deviations of
wage levels from individual-speciﬁc trends, we will consider regressions of the form:
wt = β1 + β2 t + β3 t2 + β4 Unempt + εt. (2)
All regressions will be of one of these two forms unless stated otherwise. These are not,
of course, structural models of real wage behavior, but simply a convenient method of
computing reduced-form sample correlations between real wages and unemployment. Since
the coeﬃcients in these regressions are not structurally interpretable, questions of “bias”
due to endogeneity or residual autocorrelation have little relevance or meaning.
Given two or more summary statistics of real wage behavior over time for diﬀerent
demographic groups, we will quantify diﬀerences between the two series in terms of p-values
for a test of “statistical signiﬁcance” that the two series’ coeﬃcients on the unemployment
3Because data for “bonuses, overtime, and commissions” are bracketed and hence unusable until 1975,
we also compared these wage measures to “wages and salaries” alone—the structure of the PSID ques-
tionnaire is such that this variable will often include the respondent’s bonuses and overtime data anyway
(and the “bonuses and overtime” variable itself will be nil), and hence will also be a reasonable measure
of total income earned from all employers. Again, we found virtually no diﬀerence in any of the results
using this measure of the wage rate instead of the other two.8

































































Aggregate Real Wage and Cubic Trend








































































Aggregate Real Wage, First−Differenced
Figure 4: The Aggregate “Real Wage” Statistic
rate are the same. For these tests, we use the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions framework,
allowing for the variance of the residuals to diﬀer between the two time series and for
the residuals to be contemporaneously correlated, and test the single restriction that the
coeﬃcients on ΔUnemp (or Unemp) are identical using a standard Wald test.
3. Results
3.1 Basic Results
We consider ﬁrst the aggregate wage statistic in the PSID, calculated using the PSID
sample of male heads described above. Though there are a number of alternatives, we have
chosen here total labor income of the panel divided by total hours worked (using the PSID
family weights), since this is the methodology behind the BLS’s Average Hourly Earnings
statistic (although the BLS sample excludes government, agricultural, and nonproduction
workers, while our sample here excludes those who are not male household heads, among
other diﬀerences). Figure 4 presents this statistic, in (log) levels and (log) ﬁrst-diﬀerences,
deﬂated by the 1987 GDP deﬂator, and with a cubic trend for reference (a quadratic
trend ﬁts the series signiﬁcantly more poorly, even for this brief period). A fair degree of
procyclicality is evident in the diagram, and is reﬂected in regression coeﬃcients on the
unemployment rate: the coeﬃcient on ΔUnemp in equation (1) is −.0055 (std. err. .0025,
R2 = .39), while that on Unemp using model (2) is −.0040 (std. err. .0016, R2 = .22).9












































































Figure 5: Average of Real Wage Changes in the Panel
Thus, aggregate “real wage” changes of roughly 0.4–0.55% have been associated with 1%
changes in unemployment over this period. These results are comparable to the ﬁndings
of other researchers using aggregate data covering the same sample period (Abraham and
Haltiwanger, 1995).
In contrast, the average year-to-year changes in real wages of the panel are presented
in Figure 5 (along with the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced aggregate statistic of Figure 4 for comparison).
This average change in real wages is computed as follows: Δlogwit is calculated for each
individual i with a real wage observation in both periods t−1a n dt, and the average wage
change is then taken across these individuals, weighted by the PSID family weights to make
the average representative of the U.S. population as a whole. This is the method followed
by Bils (1985) and Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994), for example, and it avoids, to a very
large extent, the aggregation biases mentioned earlier: workers are no longer weighted by
their hours worked or their income received for the preceding year (unless they work zero
hours for the year, in which case they are omitted from the sample; however, this holds for
only a tiny fraction of the labor force). The result is a substantially more procyclical picture
of real wages than before, as evident in the ﬁgure. The coeﬃcient on ΔUnemp is −.0118
(std. err. .0021, R2 = .67), double the value of −.0055 from Figure 4, and the diﬀerence is10
highly statistically signiﬁcant (p-value <. 001). This accords with the ﬁndings of SBP and
others, who conclude that composition bias is a major source of error in traditional real
wage studies, and that real wages at the individual level have been extremely procyclical
since about 1967, typically varying by more than a full percent for each 1 percentage point
change in the unemployment rate. The ﬁnding is quite striking and generally at odds with
the view that workers and ﬁrms are moving along a stable aggregate labor demand curve
o v e rt h ec o u r s eo fab u s i n e s sc y c l e .
Before continuing, however, it should be noted that we fail to conﬁrm these ﬁndings
using either local-area unemployment rates in place of the national rate, or using employee’s
straight-time hourly pay rates instead of their annual wages divided by annual hours. We
will investigate the possible reasons for this discrepancy, along with the ﬁndings themselves,
in detail below.
First, however, we turn to some ways in which the above studies can be improved
by making better use of the micro-data detail available in the PSID. Given the availability
of data on individuals’ wages, it is clearly desirable to ﬁnd a more disaggregated format
for its presentation. Regressions using the individual-level data have been run by many
authors, with individual demographic variables and the aggregate unemployment rate as
explanatory variables, but these suﬀer from the problem that the residuals are in general
contemporaneously correlated, and hence all estimated standard errors are incorrect and,
in general, downward biased (Moulton, 1986, 1990).4
The approach taken here is that of Figure 6. In every year between 1967 and 1991,
we observe an entire distribution of real wages in the panel; Figure 6 presents a contour
plot of these distributions, with contours drawn at each of the nine deciles: the middle
contour plots the median real wage observed in each year, the bottom contour plots a real
wage that is higher than exactly 10% of the wages observed in each particular year, etc. In
order to make the diagram representative of the U.S. as a whole, these deciles have been
computed using the PSID family weights. Three sets of axes are presented to emphasize
diﬀerent aspects of the distribution, ranging from its overall dispersion to ﬁner levels of
4This problem can normally be corrected by a simple GLS procedure, but here the amount of data is
so large that doing so is computationally intractable.11
Figure 6: The Distribution of Real Wages Over Time
































































































































































Dashed Line: Quadratic Trend12
detail.
From the diagram, we can immediately see that the aggregate wage movements in
Figures 4 and 5 do in fact correspond to shifts in the entire distribution of real wages in
the economy. A pronounced degree of procyclicality is evident in all the deciles of the
distribution (although noticeably more so for the bottom four, a fact which we shall return
to below). This is interesting because it demonstrates that the procyclicality noted earlier
has in fact been very widespread, and almost certainly experienced by a very large fraction
of the population. Regressing the median contour on the unemployment rate using model
(2) yields a coeﬃcient of −.0100 (std. err. .0019, R2 = .93). Regression coeﬃcients for the
other contours range between −.0075 and −.0182.
Figures 7 and 8 present, in the same format, alternative perspectives on real wage
cyclicality. In Figure 7, the distribution of real wage changes f o re a c hy e a ri sg i v e n( t h e
middle contour plots the median real wage raise (or pay cut) received by the panel in each
year, the bottom contour plots a real wage cut that is higher than exactly 10% of the real
wage cuts experienced by the panel in each year, etc.). This diagram is more comparable
to Figure 5, and is more representative of individuals’ experiences over the business cycle
than was Figure 6, which details shifts in the aggregate distribution. We can see here that
the procyclical shifts in wage changes are substantially smaller than was suggested by the
average wage changes in Figure 5 (the regression coeﬃcient of the median on ΔUnemp is
only −.0068 (std. err. .0015, R2 = .53), compared to −.0118 for the averages). This is due
to the exaggerated movements at the two tails of the distribution: a greater number of
workers receive a dramatic pay cut in each recession, while at the same time the number
of dramatic pay raises falls substantially. Still, widespread procyclicality is evident in the
diagram, conﬁrming the ﬁndings in Figures 5 and 6.
Figure 8 presents a third measure of real wage cyclicality. Each of the 10,114 men in
the sample can have a quadratic (or cubic or higher) trend ﬁtted to his (log) wages over
time. Deviations from this individual-speciﬁc trend are then computed and the distribution
of these deviations plotted in the Figure.5 The middle contour thus plots each year’s
5Individuals with three or fewer wage observations over the period are excluded, since a quadratic trend
would ﬁt their data perfectly. Results using a cubic trend are very similar.13
Figure 7: The Distribution of Real Wage Changes Over Time






























































































































































































































Figure 8: Real Wage Deviations from Individual-Speciﬁc Trends




















































































































































































































































median wage deviation from individual trend, the bottom contour plots a number which
is greater than exactly 10% of the panel’s wage deviations from individual trends, etc.
Once again, the widespread procyclicality of Figure 6 is conﬁrmed. Individuals are more
likely to experience a drop in their real wage rate when the economy is in recession, and
are more likely to receive a raise relative to trend when the economy is in a boom. The
median contour’s coeﬃcient on Unemp is −.0065 (std. err. .0011, R2 = .65).6
In general, the disaggregate approach taken here conﬁrms other researchers’ ﬁndings
of strongly procyclical real wages over the period 1967–91. In addition, we gain a sense of
how consistent across recessions and how broad across the distribution of individuals these
ﬁndings are. From the diagrams it is clear that the entire distribution of wages, by several
measures, is shifting downward in each recession. The magnitude of the shift appears
to be between roughly −.0065 and −.0100, or slightly less than 1% for each percentage
point change in the unemployment rate, in terms of the regression framework presented
earlier; this is about 1.5 to 2 times larger than the aggregate “real wage” would suggest,
but smaller than what other researchers using panel data have concluded. These other
researchers, in taking the average across the distribution, have given more weight to the
greater movement in its tails than we have here.
3.2 Nominal Wage Rigidities and Countercyclical Prices?
Having noted the depth and breadth of real wage procyclicality in the micro-level data over
this sample, it is natural to ask whether there is a simple explanation. For example, can
the results be attributed directly to the oil price shocks of these years, or more generally
to nominal wage rigidity and the countercyclicality of price movements over the sample
period?
A quick look at Figure 9 suggests that oil prices are not going to be a signiﬁcant
explanatory variable, beyond the information that is already contained in an indicator of
the business cycle. Although the oil price, here represented by the producer price of fuel
(Economic Report of the President, Table B–64), exhibits signiﬁcant spikes near each of
6For completeness, we have also tried removing individual-speciﬁc linear trends from the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
data of Figure 7. The results, which are not presented here, are very similar to those in that Figure.16



























































Figure 9: The Price of Oil
the recessions in this period, the timing does not match the wage data nearly as well as
either the unemployment rate or deviations of real GDP from trend. Moreover, the large
declines in the price of oil during the 80s are not matched well by the wage data.
These observations are borne out by a regression of the average wage change from
Figure 5 on changes in the unemployment rate and the producer price of fuel. The regres-
sion equation
Δwt = β1 + β2 t + β3 ΔUnempt + β4 Δlogpoil t + εt, (3)
yields a coeﬃcient on ΔUnemp of −.0102 (std. err. .0022), virtually the same as in the
original (nonoil) regression, while Δlog poil has a coeﬃcient of −.0463 (std. err. .0271).
Thus, a one-standard-deviation (1.1 percentage point) increase in the unemployment rate
yields about a 1.1% decrease in the real wage, while a one-standard-deviation (10.4%)
increase in the price of oil yields only about a 0.5% decrease in the real wage; moreover,
the latter eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant (p−value = .104).7 The oil shocks thus do
not seem to oﬀer a direct explanation for the behavior of real wages over this period.
Similarly, we can get a basic sense of the importance of nominal wage rigidity by
examining Figures 3 and 7. As with the oil shocks, upward movements in prices are
associated with each recession over this period; again, though, the timing and magnitude
7A regression using the median wage change from Figure 7 does yield a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
on the price of oil, but the relative magnitudes of the two coeﬃcients are unchanged.17
























































Figure 10: Nominal Wage Changes in the Panel
of these price movements do not closely match those of the real wage changes in Figures
5 or 7. A business cycle or labor market indicator clearly yields a much better ﬁt. This is
corroborated by regression as well: the model
Δwt = β1 + β2 t + β3 ΔUnempt + β4 ΔlogPt + εt, (4)
yields a coeﬃcient on ΔUnemp of −.0102 (std. err. .0021), again virtually the same as
in the original model, while the coeﬃcient on ΔlogPt is −.2598 (std. err. .1180). A one-
standard-deviation (2.1%) increase in the price level is associated with only a 0.5% decrease
in the real wage, exactly the magnitude that was associated with the price of fuel directly.
There is thus little evidence that the procyclical real wage-unemployment correlation can
be explained simply by countercyclical movements in prices over the period.
This point is further brought home by Figure 10, which depicts the undeﬂated,
nominal wage changes corresponding to the middle panel of Figure 7. There is quite a
bit of year-to-year variation in the size of nominal wage changes, and more importantly,
in every year between 1967 and 1991, over 30% of the workers in the sample experience
nominal wage cuts.8 During recessions, and the 80s and 90s, this percentage is even greater.
8McLaughlin (1994) notes the same phenomenon.18
There is thus substantial evidence against the hypothesis that nominal wage rigidity and
countercyclical prices have played any more than a modest role in the cyclical behavior of
real wages over this period.
3.3 Local Area Unemployment Rates
Given the availability of local area unemployment rates in the PSID, it is natural to ask
whether ﬁndings of real wage procyclicality persist using these variables as well.
It is reasonable to expect that local area unemployment rates should be related to
workers’ real wages, perhaps even more so than the national rate. Regional economic
downturns, such as those in the Texas-Oklahoma area in 1986 or in Southern California in
the early 1990s, clearly have important labor market eﬀects. To the extent that real wage
cyclicality is inﬂuenced by labor market conditions, we should expect to see a relationship
at the state or local level.9
Because this data is so disaggregate, a graphical approach similar to the previous
section is infeasible. Pure regression anaylsis is the most convenient and informative ap-
proach. Using local area unemployment rates, we can correct for the problem of contem-
poraneous residual correlation by including time dummies for each year; when using the
national unemployment rate we do not have this option, since the national unemployment
rate only varies in the time dimension. Unfortunately, dummies for each region cannot
be used because the PSID censors the county of residence for each family, due to privacy
considerations. Finally, note that the regressions here do not weight the observations by
the corresponding family weights, since there is no reason to think that a high-weight
individual has more accurate data than a low-weight individual.
The most natural regression to consider is
Δwit = β1 + β2 t + β3 ΔUnempit + εit, (5)




γjtδjt + β3 ΔUnempit + εit, (6)
9Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1995) investigate this relationship in some detail, and claim to ﬁnd con-
vincing evidence of negative (i.e., procyclical in this context) relationship between real wages and local
unemployment. Their use of weekly or annual wage rates rather than hourly wage rates weakens their
argument, however, since weekly and annual hours will clearly be procyclical as well.19
Table 1: Regression Coeﬃcients on Unemployment (β3)
Unemployment Measure
Regression Model
Local Rate National Rate
First Diﬀerences:
basic model (5) .0002 (.0008) −.0114 (.0016)
time dummies (6) −.0001 (.0009) N/A
basic w/ind.-speciﬁc trends −.0001 (.0007) −.0093 (.0015)
time dummies w/ind. trends −.0004 (.0009) N/A
Levels:
basic model −.0054 (.0009) −.0122 (.0023)
time dummies −.0060 (.0010) N/A
basic w/ind.-speciﬁc trends −.0007 (.0004) −.0112 (.0010)
time dummies w/ind. trends −.0003 (.0004) N/A
with time dummies. No matter what the model, however, the coeﬃcient on the local
unemployment rate is virtually zero. The results are presented in the upper middle col-
umn of Table 1. The third and fourth rows rerun regressions (5) and (6) after removing
individual-speciﬁc linear trends from each worker’s wage change data; this has the eﬀect of
controlling for all linear eﬀects of individual-speciﬁc variables (e.g., race, age, education,
experience, etc.) in one fell swoop. As can be seen from the Table, this has little impact
on the correlation with the unemployment rate.
For comparison, the upper right column of Table 1 presents results for the same
regressions using changes in the national, rather than the local, unemployment rate for
each individual (so ΔUnempit =Δ U n e m p t for all i). Note that this latter set of numbers
is very close to what was found in the analysis of the preceding section. Clearly, the
national rate is much more closely correlated with individuals’ real wages than is the local
rate in this sample.
The bottom half of the Table presents regression results for the corresponding levels
speciﬁcations of models (5) and (6). A quadratic trend term is included in these speciﬁ-
cations as well, both in model (5) and when removing individual-speciﬁc trends from the
data. Thus the last two rows of the Table control for all quadratic eﬀects of individual-
speciﬁc variables such as race, age, education, experience, etc. Using levels, the correlation20


























































































Figure 11: Straight-Time Hourly Wages vs. Annual Data, for all Hourly Workers
with the local unemployment rate is stronger than with the ﬁrst-diﬀerences, but not once
individual trends have been removed from the data.
At ﬁrst glance, these results are surprising. However, it is important to keep in
mind that local unemployment rates are typically very poorly measured in the U.S., and
this is particularly true in the PSID, in which these data were binned in the years prior
to 1981. The result of this measurement error will push all estimated coeﬃcients on the
variable toward zero, which appears to be the case here. Still, the fact that the estimated
coeﬃcients are almost exactly zero is disturbing.
3.4 Straight-Time Hourly Wage Rates
The PSID also collects data on worker’s straight-time hourly pay rates, for workers who
are explicitly paid by the hour on thir current, primary job. In Figure 11, we plot the dis-
tribution of individual workers’ straight-time hourly wage changes, along with the changes
in the annual measure of wages for these exact same workers for comparison, as calculated
from their reported annual earnings divided by annual hours.10 Aside from variation in ex-
tra earnings, income from extra jobs, reporting error, and mid-year job changes, these two
diagrams ought to be exactly identical. In fact, they are considerably diﬀerent. First, there
is a great deal less spread in the wage-change distribution for workers’ straight-time hourly
10These data are lagged appropriately, to correspond to the year in which they were earned rather than
reported, as always.21





annual data, all workers −.0068 (.0015) N/A
annual data, hourly workers −.0068 (.0017) N/A
straight-time wages, hourly workers .0000 (.0016) N/A
Regression model (4):
annual data, all workers −.0051 (.0013) −.2698 (.0743)
annual data, hourly workers −.0066 (.0020) −.0352 (.1220)
straight-time wages, hourly workers .0015 (.0016) −.2262 (.1009)
pay than there is for their annual earnings divided by annual hours. Second, the cyclical
movements of the former are more subdued, and slightly out of synch with the business
cycle indicators in Figures 1 or 2—note in particular the upticks in 1975 and 1982.11 In
fact, the timing of the straight-time hourly real wage movements appears to comove much
more closely with the price changes in Figure 3, as would be the case is nominal wages were
completely rigid. Regression analysis supports this observation: the relevant coeﬃcients
under models (1) and (4) are reported in Table 2. Note that changes in the price level
play a much greater role for straight-time hourly wages than do changes in the business
cycle indicator. This seems to indicate that nominal rigidity for straight-time wages is an
important factor, although the fact that the relationship is less than one-for-one indicates
that the rigidity is not perfect.
Nominal straight-time hourly wage rates are plotted in Figure 12. In comparison
to Figure 10, note the greater compression (i.e., smaller cross-sectional variance) of the
distribution, and the evidence of a signiﬁcant point mass at zero. In sharp contrast to
Figure 10, only 10–20% of workers in any given year experience a cut in their nominal
straight-time hourly wage rate. The picture painted here is thus one of substantially
greater nominal wage rigidity than was evident in the previous section.
11Using the PSID’s “wages and salaries” plus “bonuses, overtime and commissions” variables (or even
“wages and salaries” alone) rather than “labor income” yields essentially identical results in this section,
just as in the rest of the chapter.22
There are several possible explanations for these ﬁndings. First, reporting error may
be contaminating the annual income and hours data. Although Bound, Brown, Duncan,
and Rogers (1994) ﬁnd acceptable levels of reporting error in annual earnings and annual
hours, these errors are compounded when the quotient is taken to calculate average earnings
per hour, and they ﬁnd that this results in substantial measurement error.12 However, in
the diagrams and regressions of this and the preceding sections, measurement error is
irrelevant as long as the means or medians of the distribution come out correctly each
year. Only to the extent that means and medians are measured incorrectly, and that this
measurement error is correlated with the business cycle, will the results here be aﬀected
at all. The possible impact of measurement error on our results here is thus minimized.
However, it is possible that workers consistently bias their reported hours of work per
week toward, say, forty, resulting in an overstatement of hours worked during recessions
and an understatement during booms. If previous year’s income is reported correctly, this
would result in some procyclicality of the annually derived wage ﬁgures. However, it seems
equally likely that workers in a downturn might exaggerate their loss of annual hours due
to the recession, or unintentionally inﬂate the amount of overtime actually worked in a
particularly robust year, and it is not clear that the ﬁrst eﬀect would dominate the second.
Moreover, the fact that we are able to replicate movements in the BLS’s aggregate wage
statistic with a great deal of accuracy using PSID data suggests that measurement error of
this sort is not a serious problem. For all of these reasons, then, the eﬀects of measurement
error on our ﬁndings should be relatively minor.
Second, it is possible that additional income beyond straight-time hourly pay is re-
sponsible for the observed diﬀerences between the two ﬁgures. Bonuses, overtime, tips,
commissions, and pay premia for evening and night shift work are all obviously very pro-
cyclical sources of income, and could potentially lead to exactly the eﬀects documented
here. Unfortunately, there is almost no direct data on these income components in the
PSID. As mentioned earlier, data on extra income from bonuses, overtime, and the like is
very often lumped together with “wages and salaries” in the PSID questionnaire, leaving
12The PSID attempts to minimize reporting errors in income by surveying its subjects shortly after
income tax returns are due.23
































































25,867 observations of 4454 men
Figure 12: Nominal Straight-Time Hourly Wage Changes
the “bonuses, overtime, and commissions” variable completely blank. The small amount of
data that does exist in the PSID regarding these variables has no discernible eﬀect on any
of the diagrams presented so far. Evidence from the BLS’s establishment survey indicates
that average weekly overtime hours of production workers in manufacturing varies about
1.5 hours over the course of a business cycle. Dividing by the average, 40-hour workweek,
and assuming a 50% premium for overtime yields an impact on average wages of about
((1.5)(1.5) + 40)/41.5=1 .018, or a little less than 2% over the course of a business cycle.
From Shapiro (1996), the workweek of capital in manufacturing varies about 10% over
the course of a business cycle; assuming a 25% premium for shift work (as Shapiro does)
yields an additional impact of ((.1)(1.25)+ 1)/1.1=2 .3% on the average wage. (Unfortu-
nately, we are not aware of any data on the importance of bonuses in U.S. manufacturing
or any other industry, especially as it varies over the business cycle.) However, overtime
and shift premia together are already accounting for roughly 4% movements in wages over
the course of a business cycle, which is virtually as large, and certainly the same order of
magnitude, as the eﬀect we are trying to explain. Although manufacturing as an industry
is very overtime- and shift work-intensive, the magnitude of movement in bonuses, tips,
and commissions in other industries is likely to be of the same order of magnitude as in24
manufacturing.13 Overall, then, this explanation is a feasible one.
One might think that second or even third jobs could help to explain workers’ real
wage procyclicality in a similar fashion. However, in order to have a procyclical rather
than countercyclical eﬀect, the additional jobs must pay higher wages than the worker’s
main job. Although it is plausible, we are not aware of any empirical evidence on this
point. Moreover, second jobs are held by only a relatively small fraction (6%) of the work
force, according to BLS statistics, so any eﬀects will be minor in relation to the aggregate.
It is thus probably safe to dismiss this theory as a possible explanation for the ﬁndings of
the present paper.
Finally, job changes over the course of a year, or job seasonality, could lead to
discrepancies between a worker’s reported straight-time hourly wage rate and his actual
average hourly wage over the course of the year. This would be the case if, for example,
a worker’s straight-time wage at the time of interview was not representative of the wage
he actually earned over the rest of the year. As regards job changes, both Bils (1985) and
Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1992) have noted the large procyclical impact of a job change
on a worker’s wage, but if the change occurs prior to the PSID interview for a given year, it
will be picked up in the reported straight-time hourly wage rate for that year as well. Even
if the change occurs after the time of interview for a given year, it will still be picked up in
the reported hourly wage at the time of interview the following year. Thus, at worst, the
eﬀect of job changes on reported straight-time hourly wage rates will simply be to spread
the change out over a two-year period, blurring it somewhat but not hiding it altogether.
This is not what we observed in Figure 11. As regards job seasonality, it is not clear that
there would be any variation in this phenomenon over the course of a business cycle, which
would preclude it from being a signiﬁcant explanator of the discrepancy noted in Figure 11
as well. Thus, it seems that we can also eliminate both of these theories as explanations for
the diﬀering behavior of straight-time hourly wage rates and average wage rates derived
from annual data over the course of the business cycle.
13The bonuses, overtime, etc. explanation may also help to explain why women’s wages are signiﬁcantly
less procyclical than men’s, as documented by Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994). To the extent that men
are concentrated in more overtime- and shift work-intensive industries, we would expect their wages to be
more procyclical.25
To summarize, then, it appears that bonuses, tips, commissions, and premia for
overtime and shift work are playing a substantial role in the observations of real wage pro-
cyclicality that we made earlier. Straight-time hourly wages, by contrast, do not appear to
vary signiﬁcantly over the business cycle; in fact, they appear to exhibit substantial nom-
inal rigidity,14 and vary more (inversely) with movements in prices than with movements
in a labor market indicator or indicator of the business cycle.
3.5 Demographic Diﬀerences in Real Wage Cyclicality
Having studied the behavior of real wages over the business cycle for the population as a
whole, it is natural to ask to what extent observed cyclicality diﬀers across major demo-
graphic groups. This question is interesting for two reasons: First, demographic diﬀerences
in real wage cyclicality can shed light on certain macroeconomic theories; for example, in
the presence of insider-outsider eﬀects, we would expect to see the equilibrium wage of
young labor market entrants vary much more than the wages of older, more established
workers. Second, demographic diﬀerences in real wage cyclicality help to identify empir-
ically the nature and magnitude of aggregation bias in the data; for example, we have
already noted above how bias can arise from changes in worker composition, industry
composition, and the greater weighting of high-income individuals. How large is each of
these compositional eﬀects in practice?15
Rather than present a full array of graphs for each demographic comparison, only
the middle set of axes for the ﬁrst-diﬀerences speciﬁcation (corresponding to Figure 7) will
be presented. Results corresponding to the methods of Figures 6 and 8 (the levels and
deviations methods) are typically very similar.16
14Note that this ﬁnding is in contrast to McLaughlin (1994), who only looks at workers’ annual data.
15Note that Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) attribute aggregation bias in their sample to the ﬁrst
source, while Bils (1985) attributes it to the third. There has not been any attempt in the literature to
separate out the relative sizes of these eﬀects.
16The breadth of the wage level distributions of Figure 6 makes it diﬃcult to view both cyclical variation
and a reasonable fraction of the distribution at the same time, and the necessity of ﬁtting a quadratic trend
that is downward-sloping in the later years of the sample is a drawback. Although one might think that
the very high R2 of the levels regressions in Figure 6 indicates a superior ﬁt, in fact it is due primarily to
the explanatory power of the quadratic trend rather than the unemployment rate; the raw sum of squared
residuals for the levels regression is in fact about 40% greater than that for the ﬁrst-diﬀerences, indicating
an inferior ﬁt. Finally, the previous literature has generally focused on ﬁrst-diﬀerences rather than levels,
so focusing on that format here enhances comparability to previous work.26
























































































































































Figure 13: Wage Cyclicality for Low-Income vs. High-Income Workers
We begin with a comparison of real wage cyclicality across high- and low-income
individuals. Recall that there was already suggestive evidence of such a diﬀerence in
the wage level contours of Figure 6. Moreover, Bils (1985) attributes almost all of the
aggregation bias in his sample to the diﬀerence in cyclicality between these income groups,
rather than to changes in sample composition over the cycle. So the existence and size of
a diﬀerence between these groups is important.
Note that income, rather than wages, is the appropriate basis for comparison here: for
example, high-wage workers who work no hours have no impact on the average aggregate











Relative changes in wages, Δlogwit, are weighted exactly by the individual’s share in total
labor income.17
We begin by calculating labor income deciles for each year. Individuals who earn
zero labor income in a given year are not counted, and we use the family weights as usual.
High-income individuals are deﬁned to be those with labor income in the top ﬁve deciles,
and low-income earners those in the bottom ﬁve. In looking at ﬁrst-diﬀerenced data, we
apply this criterion to the ﬁrst of the two years that make up a person’s wage change.
The results are presented in Figure 13. It is clear that low-income workers have
17Section 3.6 provides a more complete breakdown of aggregate wage cyclicality into its constituent
components.27
experienced much greater wage cyclicality than their high-income counterparts over this
period; the coeﬃcients on the medians of the ﬁgures are −.0111 (std. err. .0023, R2 = .55)
and −.0047 (std. err. .0018, R2 = .27) respectively, and this diﬀerence is highly statistically
signiﬁcant (p−value = .019). Thus, low-income workers experience greater cyclality in
wages as well as in employment over the business cycle.18 Income-weighting may indeed
be an important source of bias in the aggregate wage statistic. We will return to this
question below.
We next focus on race, age, and education, looking at whites vs. blacks (and ignoring
others), age groups 20–29, 30–44, and 45–54 (ignoring others), and individuals with no
high school degree, those with a high school degree or GED but no years of college, and
those with a four-year college degree (again, ignoring others). The breakdown by age is
of particular interest, since wages of new entrants into the labor market may be more
sensitive to cycliclal conditions than those already on the “inside.”
Figure 14 presents the full array of graphs for a demographic partition along these
lines. Note that the ﬁgures for blacks have been omitted due to small cell sizes that result
in an enormous amount of noise and an inability to draw meaningful conclusions.19 Even
for whites, there is an issue of small sample sizes for many of the cells; still, real wage
procyclicality is evident in virtually every one of the diagrams. Indeed, the estimated
coeﬃcient of the median on changes in the unemployment rate is negative for every single
cell—the results are presented in Table 3.
The tremendous amount of cyclical variation in wages of the youngest and least-
educated workers is the most striking feature of the diagram. Here, at least, an insider-
outsider theory appears to be borne out. More generally, it does appear that wage cycli-
cality decreases with both age and education, at least in the ﬁrst two rows of the Figure.
However, none of the diﬀerences in medians is statistically signiﬁcant by any conventional
18This empirical observation remains true when we control for other demographic variables such as race,
age, and education as well; however, the diﬀerence between estimated medians of the corresponding ﬁgures
loses its statistical signiﬁcance, owing to a greater amount of noise in the data, due to the smaller number
of observations.
19Lumping all blacks together and comparing them to all whites conﬁrms that the wage distributions of
the former ﬂuctuate more dramatically over time; but there is not a clear diﬀerence in the wage cyclicality
of blacks vis-a-vis whites.28
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Wage Cyclicality by Demographic Group, Whites
Age No HS Degree HS Degree, No College College Degree
20–29 −.0436 (.0097), R2 = .49 −.0106 (.0034), R2 = .41 −.0063 (.0064), R2 = .18
30–44 −.0045 (.0058), R2 = .06 −.0081 (.0020), R2 = .55 −.0023 (.0030), R2 = .06
45–54 −.0053 (.0040), R2 = .21 −.0076 (.0049), R2 = .12 −.0041 (.0036), R2 = .10
measure, except for the youngest and least educated workers (i.e., the top left cell), who
experience wage changes that are signiﬁcantly more procyclical than those of any other
cell (p-values all less than .01). Thus, there is suggestive evidence of decreasing cyclicality
with age and education within the sample, especially for the youngest and least educated
workers, but the ﬁnding has only limited statistical support on the whole.
3.6 Sources of Aggregation Bias
We have discussed above the possible importance of worker composition bias, industrial
composition bias, and income weighting on the measured cyclicality of the aggregate real
wage statistic. Researchers have diﬀered regarding the relative importance of these factors,
with Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) coming down strongly in favor of the ﬁrst source
of bias, and Bils (1985) very much emphasizing the third. Moreover, with our ﬁnding of
substantial diﬀerences in real wage cyclicality between high- and low-income workers in the
previous section, it would be interesting to know how much this discrepancy contributes
to the aggregation bias identiﬁed earlier. In this section, we provide a decomposition of
aggregation bias into its constituent components, which will help shed light on these issues.
For clarity of exposition, assume that hours and wages are both perfectly correlated
with the business cycle, so that
hijt = ¯ hij +( ¯ hijγij)ut,
wijt =¯ wij +(¯ wijβij)ut,
where hijt and wijt are hours and wages for industry i,w o r k e rj,a tt i m et,a n dut is an
indicator of the business cycle, such as the unemployment rate (expressed as a deviation
from the natural rate of unemployment).30
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βij Δut. (8)
The second term on the right hand side of (8) is the income-weighted average of the indi-
viduals’ wage cyclicality coeﬃcients, βij. The ﬁrst term on the right reﬂects the change in
sample composition over the period: it depends only on cyclical ﬂuctuations in individuals’
hours (the γij), and not on individual wage cyclicality at all. In fact, the quantity inside
the summation is exactly the sample covariance of individuals’ wages and their cyclicality31
of hours γij, with each individual assigned a weight equal to his average hours ¯ hij over the
period. When this covariance is negative (as when low-wage workers are more likely to
be laid oﬀ in a recession), a downward bias is imparted to the cyclicality of the aggregate
wage statistic.
We can further separate the composition bias term into industry and worker compo-
nents. Let ¯ wi be the average wage in industry i, and deﬁne
¯ wj ≡ ¯ wij − ¯ wi























 ¯ hij ¯ wij ¯ hij ¯ wij
βij Δut.
There is industrial composition bias when ¯ wi is correlated with γij, and worker composition
bias when ¯ wj is correlated with γij. In the U.S., the ﬁrst correlation is positive and the
second is negative.
To determine exactly to what extent composition bias impacts the cyclicality of the
aggregate wage statistic, we need only consider the term:
 ¯ hij ¯ wij ¯ hij ¯ wij

βij Δut,
which is just ΔlogWt with the composition shift terms removed. Since Δlogwijt= βijΔut,
this becomes:
 ¯ hij ¯ wij ¯ hij ¯ wij

Δlogwijt. (9)
A regression of (9) on the change in the unemployment rate will then yield the desired,
composition-bias free coeﬃcient. Note, however, that this is diﬀerent from the regression
that other panel studies have actually run. There, it is standard practice to regress the









on the change in the unemployment rate, which purges the eﬀects of income-weighting from
the cyclicality of the aggregate wage statistic as well. Regression estimates for equation (10)32
that yield substantially greater procyclicality than a regression of the aggregate wage
statistic are thus not conclusive as to the importance of composition bias by itself. We saw
in the previous section that income-weighting was potentially a large source of diﬀerence
between these regression estimates, also.
To accurately assess the importance of composition bias, we must run regression (9)
(including a constant and time trend to account for growth in average wages over time).
The result is a composition-free coeﬃcient on ΔUnemp of −.0120 (s.e. .0027), which is
essentially identical to the value of −.0118 obtained by traditional panel studies using
equation (10). Thus, despite the important diﬀerences in wage cyclicality by income group
apparent in Figure 13, for all practical purposes income-weighting appears to play a neg-
ligible role in the cyclicality of the aggregate wage statistic. All of the bias observed in
going from the aggregate to the panel regression appears to be due to changes in sample
composition. The ﬁndings here thus come down strongly in favor of the composition eﬀects
emphasized by Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) rather than the income-weighting favored
by Bils (1985).
4. Discussion and Conclusions
We draw several conclusions from this analysis. First, real wages of individual workers in
the U.S. were strongly procyclical from 1967 to 1991, much more so than previous studies
of aggregated real wage data have suggested. This ﬁnding is robust across recessions as
well as pervasive throughout the U.S. economy, shifting the entire distribution of workers’
wages by any of several measures. This pattern of real wage movements tracks the business
cycle very closely, and cannot be explained simply by price movements and nominal wage
rigidity or by the oil shocks that occurred during the period.
Second, workers’ straight-time hourly pay rates vary much less over the business
cycle than do their wages as measured by total annual income divided by total annual
hours. Indeed, straight-time hourly pay rates seem to suﬀer from substantial nominal wage
rigidity. A number of possible explanations were oﬀered for this diﬀerence in cyclicality,
with the evidence strongly favoring variation in bonuses, overtime, shift premia, tips, and33
commissions as the source of cyclical variation in total wages. The implication is that
employers have some latitude with which they can easily adjust wages over the business
cycle, but are more constrained when it comes to larger adjustments of nominal wages, for
which changes in straight-time pay might be required.
Third, the correlation of real wages with local area unemployment rates is small,
although this may be due to the large amount of noise present in the local area unem-
ployment statistics, particularly as they are reported in the PSID. Future research using
state-level unemployment rates could potentially resolve these diﬃculties, and replicate
the ﬁndings of procyclicality that are apparent with respect to the national rate.
Fourth, there are demographic diﬀerences in real wage cyclicality that can provide
insight into the labor market. For example, real wage cyclicality appears to decrease with
age, education, and income, supporting insider-outsider models of the labor market, in
which the youngest and least experienced workers are the most susceptible to ﬂuctuations
in labor market conditions and those on the “inside” are more insulated from these shocks.
The substantially smaller cyclicality of high-income workers’ wages also raises the possi-
bility that this is a major source of the muted cyclicality that is found in the aggregate
real wage statistic computed by the BLS, as suggested by Bils (1985). However, a detailed
decomposition of this statistic showed that this is not the case; instead, the diﬀerence
appears to be due to the changing composition of the work force over the business cycle,
as maintained by Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994).
It should be emphasized, however, that just because workers’ wages were signiﬁcantly
procylical from 1967 to 1991 does not imply that they have always been so. For example,
anecdotal evidence from the Great Depression and the 1920–21 contraction strongly sug-
gests that real wages were countercyclical during these episodes: e.g., “[Benjamin] Strong
wanted to wait until wage rates were lower. He noted that deposits had fallen oﬀ consid-
erably, retail prices had fallen moderately, wholesale prices precipitously [56%], but wages
had hardly been aﬀected,” (Friedman and Schwartz (1963), p. 234). In fact, these obser-
vations lend support to the idea that employers can easily vary a worker’s wages only to
the extent that they can vary his bonuses, commissions, shift premia, and the like. Larger
changes in nominal wages may be constrained by the rigidity that appears to be present34
in workers’ straight-time hourly pay. The nominal wage declines on the order of 5% that
employers managed to implement in the post-1967 PSID sample might well be swamped
by larger price changes such as those that took place during the Great Depression and
1920–21 contraction.
Finally, Swanson (2004) shows that, despite the procyclicality of individual workers’
wages with respect to aggregrate price measures like the CPI and GDP deﬂator, workers’
wages have been countercyclical over both the post-War and post-1967 period when those
wages are deﬂated by the price index of the worker’s own 2-digit or 4-digit industry and
compared to the state of economic activity in that same industry. Intuitively, a positive
economic shock that impacts one sector of the economy more than others can lead to
an increase in the relative price of that sector’s good, a corresponding decrease in that
sector’s real wage deﬂated by its product price, and an increase in employment and the
utilization of capital (and labor) in that sector. This change in capital and labor utilization
is consistent with an increase in labor productivity and CPI-deﬂated real wages in the
sector despite the fall in real wages deﬂated by the sector’s product price. These eﬀects can
be demonstrated rigorously in a fully speciﬁed general equilibrium framework (Swanson,
2006). The observations in this paper and the others mentioned above suggest that this
pattern may be a common feature of the post-War U.S. economy and thus that further
empirical and theoretical work along these lines might be illuminating.35
Appendix: Detailed Data and Methods
The PSID data for the interview years 1968–88 was taken from the 1988 cross-year
family-individual ﬁle, available on cdrom. Data for the interview years 1989–92 were down-
loaded from the PSID’s home page on the World Wide Web. As mentioned in section 2.1,
my sample consists of all men who were ever household heads in the PSID, excluding
the Latino sample. For each of these men, I made use of the following variables (num-
bers in parentheses indicate the 1992 variable number for exact reference, and years for
which comparable data were available, if not the entire period): total labor income of
head (V21484); wages and salaries of head (V20429, 1970–92); bonuses, overtime, and
commissions of head (V20431, 1976–92); annual hours worked by head (V20344); head’s
race (V21420), age (V30736), and education (V21504, V21423); whether head is employed
by the government or private sector (V20698, 1975–92); whether head’s job is covered
by a union contract (V20699, 1976–92); head’s hourly wage if paid by the hour (V20707,
1970–92); unemployment rate in head’s county of residence (V21521); and family weight
for the head’s family (V21547).
A few of these variables required modiﬁcation in order to remove deﬁciencies or make
them comparable to other years’ data. Labor income is top-coded at $99,999 until 1983,
at which point it is top-coded at $999,999. I obtained a list of the true values for these
incomes through 1988 from Gary Solon, and entered them in by hand. Between 1988 and
1992, there are only 1 or 2 people who ever reach the top-coded amount, and their data
were omitted for those years. Wages and salaries are similarly top-coded, and I omitted
those data unless it was clear from the context that the individual’s wages and salaries
were equal to his labor income, in which case I assigned the labor income values from
the top-coded list. Bonuses, overtime, and commissions are top-coded at $99,999, and I
omitted these data unless the true value could be deduced from the context as being equal
to labor income minus wages and salaries. Finally, in 1992, the income of self-employed
businessmen and professionals appears to have been top-coded at $99,999 even within the
labor income variable—this was not the case in earlier years—so it was necessary to delete
2 or 3 observations on this basis as well.36
The education variable changes formats in 1985 and again in 1992, so that in later
years it becomes necessary to modify the variable for comparability, by including those
with a GED in the high-school bracket after 1985, and by binning the 1992 data into
corresponding brackets for earlier years.
Finally, the unemployment data through 1980 is available only in 2% brackets rather
than to the nearest whole percent, as in later years. I simply assigned the midpoint of the
bracket to these years, which is equivalent to rounding unemployment to the nearest 2%,
rather than the nearest whole percent. No attempt was made to account for heteroskedas-
ticity in the econometric analysis. Unemployment was also lagged one year for both the
1991 and 1992 interview years, thereby replacing the 1990 value as well, due to a change
in the deﬁnition of the variable.
The annual hours, labor income, and wages and salaries data were subjected to
an accuracy screening in order to eliminate observations for which “major assignments”
were made by the PSID staﬀ. This is necessary when wage cyclicality is the subject of
study, since the PSID’s most common assignment procedure by far is simply to give the
previous year’s value to the current year, creating a bias towards zero change. About 3%
of the weighted observations in recent years have major assignments to labor income, and
about 2.5% have major assignments to annual hours. The screening procedure for labor
income is straightforward until 1976, at which point there are separate accuracy codes
for wages and salaries and for “labor income excluding wages and salaries.” I deleted the
labor income observation if and only if either of these variables report major assignments.
For annual hours, the procedure is straightforward until 1985, at which point there are
separate accuracy codes for hours on main job, hours on extra jobs, and hours of overtime.
I ignored the accuracy of overtime hours and deleted the observation if and only if hours
on either the main job or extra jobs was a major assignment. Screening the wages and
salaries variable is straightforward for all years.
As noted throughout the text, the data were weighted using the PSID family weights.
This is superior to simply truncating the SEO subsample, since it gives us roughly 40%
more observations, not to mention that it corrects for diﬀerential nonresponse across de-
mographic groups, which truncating the SEO does not. The observations could also be37
weighted using the PSID individual weights. However, this is essentially equivalent to dis-
carding nonsample spouses and doubling the weight of sample members who themselves
have nonsample spouses. The resulting weighted population is the same, so I found it
preferable not to discard these observations. Finally, when dealing with wage changes, I
simply assigned the family weight for the latter of the two years that make up the individ-
ual’s wage change.38
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